

Addressing Agamemnon: A Pilot Study of Politeness and Pragmatics in the *Iliad**

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SUMMARY: This paper will examine some of the pragmatic and sociolinguistic factors that inform the poet's choice of (vocative) forms of address for characters in the *Iliad* in light of the Parry-Lord theory of oral composition and its claims of "economy of form" and the "essential idea." I will look specifically at two types of address: the given-name vs. the patronymic. From a sociolinguistic standpoint, the distribution of these forms is constrained by the relative social standing of the speaker and the addressee. Sociolinguistic factors such as degree of social distance and relative position within the social hierarchy combine with specific situational pragmatic factors to place constraints on the appropriateness of competing forms of address. In other words, the choice of form of address is affected by important matters of social hierarchy and the practical movement of the plot.

1. INTRODUCTION

φθέγγεο δ' ἥ κεν ἴησθα καὶ ἐγρήγορθαι ἄνωχθι,
πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς ὀνομάζων ἄνδρα ἕκαστον,
πάντας κυδαίνων· μηδὲ μεγαλίζεο θυμῷ. (*Il.*10.67–69)

Give a shout wherever you go and order them to wake up,
and each man, address him by the ancestry of his father and his name,
and so acknowledge to all their glory, and don't take a haughty tone with them.¹

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¹ All translations are the author's. The Greek text is that of Allen's 1931 edition.

AS AGAMEMNON HIMSELF INDICATES AT *IL*.10.68–69, identity, ancestry, and glory (κῦδος) are all intricately linked for the Homeric hero. How one is addressed is important for how one is defined; it is, after all, how one is remembered (κλέος). In this paper I will take some initial steps in examining the use of forms of address within the *Iliad*, specifically as a possible reflection of social identity.² Any such social identity is a fiction, of course, the creation of the poet, since it is found expressed within a world that is itself fictional. Nevertheless, such a fictional social identity may still be reflected in the language of the characters who inhabit such a fictional world. The purpose here is to show how sociolinguistic factors—such as degree of social distance and degree of power differential—combined with specific situational factors can place constraints on the appropriateness of certain forms of address, even within a theoretically orally derived work such as the *Iliad*.³ The poet's choices of forms of address will be shown to respond to contextual factors directly, in ways that mirror those of spoken language. Understanding how such forms work helps one to read the Homeric poems as representing a world that functions like a real world. For Agamemnon the two most relevant forms of address are the vocatives of the patronymic and the given-name, Ἀτρεΐδῃ and Ἀγάμεμνον, respectively.

As part of such a project, I must, of necessity, confront what is now termed the oral theory of composition by formulae, as it is still applied to the “fixed ... ornamental epithet” (Parry 22). Contra Parry, it will be suggested that the two alternative forms of address that refer to the identity of the addressee most directly, the patronymic and the given name, are not merely metrical alternatives for each other but also reflect aspects of the poet's constructed social space and, thereby, the relationships of the characters within that space. By employing a sociolinguistic model of language in reading the poem, specifically, a version of Brown and Levinson's “politeness theory” (Brown and Levinson 87–91), we can begin to see how the poet was able to construct a complex and dynamic social space and locate his characters within that space in a convincing way.

In this paper, I will begin by discussing some of the features of what is now termed Oral Theory that bear on a contextually sensitive reading of

² Dickey's 1996 study on address omits poetic texts. This paper, while treating forms of address specifically, aims at establishing the validity of applying sociolinguistic methods in general to the study of represented speech (speeches) in poetic texts.

³ Some progress in the use of sociolinguistics for the examination of ancient Greek texts has already been made, see especially Collinge, Ervin-Tripp, Hooker 1998, and Lateiner.

Homer.⁴ Especially problematic is the concept of the “(given) essential idea” through its claims about “economy” or “thrift” (Lord 65, Parry 13 and 272).⁵ The notion of an essential persona or character behind each name contrasts strongly with that of the socially constructed persona advocated here. I will then discuss in brief, the theoretical foundation, usually termed “politeness theory,” that I will be applying to forms of address in the *Iliad*.⁶ Before discussing Agamemnon proper, I will begin with a test case, Akhilleus, as a way of establishing a norm against which Agamemnon’s special situation can be contrasted. By proceeding in this fashion, the truly anomalous character of Agamemnon’s social position, and how this is reflected in the language of the poem, will be revealed.

The concept of the essential idea plays a central, one might say foundational, role in Parry’s system of metrical economy or thrift, itself critical to his conception of the oral poet. Parry’s idea of metrical economy was a simple one, namely, that for every (given) essential idea there was at most one form for each applicable grammatical category, and for each metrical slot in the hexameter line. The epic formulae reflecting this given essential idea served to aid composition in performance—and perhaps to add a traditional tone to the resultant poetry—but at the cost of what Parry calls “*le mot juste*” (Parry 133). According to Parry and Lord, the poet would choose a form like Ἀτρεΐδῃ when he needed to fill a choriambic metron (— ∼ —) with a vocative case form referring to the essential idea of Agamemnon and the form Ἀγάμεμνον when he needed to fill an ionic metron (∼ — —).⁷

⁴ See Edwards 1986 and 1988 for an excellent and very thorough survey of the literature. Russo 1997 offers a good update. Cf. Knox’s introduction to Eagles’ *Iliad* (Knox 15–17) for an example of the continued importance of Parry’s findings concerning the fixed epithet and the system of metrical economy.

⁵ The term “given” was later added by Parry to the definition of the formula in “The Epic Technique of Oral Verse Making I,” see Parry 13 and 272 respectively. The term “given” suggests that for Parry, and Lord after him, who borrowed the definition verbatim (Lord 4), the essential idea preceded its appearance at any point in the poem and was therefore fixed, i.e., behind every particular appearance in the poem lay a singular essence which gave its expression in the various formulae. Edwards suggests that the addition of the term “given” is “insignificant” (Edwards 1986: 189). Lord 65 states “[T]he formula means its essential idea ... ‘drunken tavern’ means ‘tavern’” (65). Based on this formulation, we can fairly assume that, for Lord, Ἀτρεΐδῃ κύδιστε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον is used no differently from Ἀγάμεμνον. This paper will argue the opposite.

⁶ See Brown and Levinson.

⁷ The vocative form Ἀγάμεμνον appears only in line final position, where a short final syllable is allowed to stand for a long. The form appears in eight of nine instances in the phrase ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον, where, as part of this larger phrase, it must be line final for metrical reasons.

The only semantic correlate the form had was with the essential idea itself, in this case, “Agamemnon.” This system, Parry claimed, allowed the poet to immediately “find” the correct form at any point in the act of composing in performance without having to memorize a fixed text. If Agamemnon were called Ἀτρεΐδῃ at some point, it would be because the meter could accommodate only that term and none of the others that might potentially be used to refer to Agamemnon in the vocative case. Therefore, the term Ἀτρεΐδῃ could not be assumed to carry any other implication beyond that which compelled its choice in the first place: meter.⁸

Parry’s attempt to demonstrate how the Homeric poems were mostly formulaic as part of his proposal for an orally composed *Iliad* and *Odyssey* has been much criticized (Parry). As Hoekstra suggests, this stance forces him to abandon the earlier concept of economy, which stands over-against that of the essential idea (Hoekstra 1965: 11; see also Edwards 1986: 190). Hainsworth (1968) shows how, outside of the nominative case, Parry’s system of noun-epithet formulae shows many gaps and is therefore more difficult to apply consistently. In addition, while the nominative case forms tend to cluster at the verse end, the other case forms show much greater positional freedom. However, Hainsworth’s suggestion to abandon metrical constraints all together in a definition of the formula seems too strong, especially in light of the poet’s consistent use of a rather inflexible meter.⁹ Both Nagler (1974) and Kiparski suggest how the notion of the formulaic expression can be related to regular features of spoken language. Especially important here is Kiparski’s contention that the formula is analogous to bound or idiomatic expressions in spoken language such as “foregone conclusion,” or “be that as it may” (Kiparski 76).¹⁰ Both Hainsworth’s and Kiparski’s analyses suggest that the formula should be viewed as internally complex such that one element immediately suggests those that follow it. Bakker, after Chafe (1994), suggests how the cola, the basic compositional units into which the hexameter verse is divided, can reflect basic units of thought. Chafe has noted a tendency for

⁸ “[T]he meaning of the fixed epithet has thus a reduced importance: it is used inactively by the poet” (Parry 249).

⁹ However, the poet does make frequent use of alternate forms, metrical lengthening, correction, elision, hiatus and the movable *nu* to ameliorate some of the hexameter’s rigidity. We may compare the situation found in Homer with that found in the *Rig Veda* where both freer meter, as well as greater metrical irregularity, are observed (see, e.g., Van Nooten and Holland, 1994).

¹⁰ Note, in Kiparski’s example “foregone conclusion,” the term “foregone” is of otherwise very restrictive usage. In general, bound expressions tend to show opaque syntax as in the case of phrases such as *be that as it may* or *such as*. Often this is a step on the way to univerbation as in *nevertheless*.

spoken discourse to be highly paratactic and to consist of sequences of short phrase-like “intonation units” in succession (quoted in Bakker 1997: 47). Bakker offers this as a model for what is found in the Homeric hexameter (Bakker 1997: 44–53). Thus, the poet constructs the string of phrases in the verse out of special intonation units, the cola forming formulas of Homeric poetry as in spoken discourse. Along similar lines, Kahane talks about metrical units as “sense-units,” arguing that “metrical structure can be semantically functional” (Kahane 17). Kahane notes that statistically, vocatives tend to appear verse-initially, which correlates with a tendency for them to appear either utterance-initially or after an important point of emphasis while allowing for metrical constraints as well.¹¹ Kahane also notes that vocatives often undergo metrical alterations (such as the addition of the particle *ō*) to allow them to fit verse-initially. While Parry and Lord tended to see Homeric discourse as defined by the constraints of composition-in-performance at the expense of expressiveness, what the above scholarship has in common is a growing tendency to see Homeric discourse in terms analogous to other, specifically spoken, discourses and not as fundamentally distinct from them.

The preceding reactions to Parry all share with him a common descriptive approach to the problem of the Homeric text. As Shannon notes, one might also approach the text from the point of view of the “audience’s expectation” (Shannon 1976: 55). The approaches of Nagler, Kiparski, and Bakker move in this direction by viewing composition as part of a cognitive process akin to speech. Nagler, in fact, in a nod to Chomsky terms his approach generative, thus invoking non-poetic language. The other half of the cognitive process of language, somewhat underrepresented in literary studies until recently, is of course reception. Nagy and Foley see an important feature of audience reception for Homeric poetry in connection with the vast semantic field of what has come, after Parry, to be labeled the tradition (Nagy 1979 and 1997; and Foley 1991 and 1999). For Foley and Nagy, reception involves tapping into

¹¹ Kahane’s findings correlate nicely with what we find in Vedic, where vocatives appear either initially in the half-line, where they are accented, or sentence initially, where they are accented, or postpositively, where they are *unaccented*. This suggests that, when emphatic, vocatives would have been sentence initial and accented. Thus RV 1.1.4 a-c: *Ágne yám yajñám adhvarám/ viçvátah paribhúr ási/ sá íd devés̥u gacchati*, “Agni, the sacrificial service which you encompass everywhere, this indeed goes among the gods.” This can be compared with RV 1.50.4 a-b: *taránir viçvadarçato/ jyotis̥kr̥d asi Suria*, “shining, with all things seen, you’re the lightmaker, Surya.” At the beginning of 1.1.4 a, the vocative *Ágne* is accented, while at the end of 1.50.4 b, *Suria*, also vocative, is not. Prominence for vocatives in Vedic Sanskrit is then achieved both accentually and positionally, the latter of which compares nicely with what Kahane notes about the position of personal noun vocatives (PNVs) in Homer.

this vast diachronic semantic field or network. Thus, terms like γλαυκῶπις in the phrase γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη are never actually empty, since they represent touchstones in the network of traditional associations surrounding the *Athene* of epic. Foley refers to the meaning so conjured as “inherent meaning,” which the traditional language “necessarily summons” (Foley 1991: 9). The tradition, then, summons or cues a certain restricted network of meanings for those who are able to read the signs properly. In this way, tradition operates much like genre in that, for the savvy reader, it cues possible readings and excludes others, while these cues are lost on the uninitiated.¹²

While Nagy and Foley look outside the text itself to inform their readings of Homer, other scholars who have attempted to open the poems up to more sensitive readings have done so by looking within the text. Beck shows how the poet’s choice of one or the other of certain doublets—“formulae” with the same referent and metrical shape, but differing in lexica, e.g., βοῶπις πότνια and θεὰ λευκώλενος for Hera—can be read as sensitive to contextual factors. Along the same lines, Edwards, in discussing phrases that introduce speeches like τὸν (or τὴν or τοὺς) δ’ ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη suggests that “closer observation shows that the range of tone possible within formulaic expressions [...] is considerable and that in addition to this a number of speech introductions occur only once and are designed for the particular circumstances in which they are found” (Edwards 1970: 1). Thus, serious problems with the strong Parry-Lord model have been noted. Specifically, it is not at all clear what Parry actually meant by essential idea, or how he believed it to exist. He leaves the term undefined and unexplained.¹³ Edwards 1986: 190 calls it “vague semasiologically,” which I take to mean that the term “essential idea” was underspecified by Parry.

That forms of address are subject to selectional criteria that are non-metrical, and therefore beyond what Parry seemed to allow under the concept of the essential idea, has already been noted. Rainer Friedrich, for instance, observes the way Akhilleus’s insulting use of full-line forms of address for

¹² Better, it cues the reader to select an appropriate set of readings from a number of simultaneously available possible sets of readings, i.e., it constrains possible readings. In this way, *genre* and *register* would seem to be related since *genre* refers to a set of cues that allow the sensitive reader to access the appropriate semantic network, and one of the sets of cues available is *diction* (or *lexicon*).

¹³ Parry’s definition, that by “essential” he means “what remains after all stylistic superfluity has been taken from it” (Parry 13) is essentially circular; i.e., what is essential is everything that is not nonessential.

A more detailed critique of the central concept of the (given) essential idea will be taken up by this author in a forthcoming paper (under preparation).

TABLE 1. AKHILLEUS' FULL VERSE ADDRESSES FOR AGAMEMNON

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|----|---|
| a. | 'Ατρείδη κύδιστε φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων (<i>Il.</i> 1.122)
"Atreusson the most glorious; no, rather the most covetous of all" ¹⁴ |
| b. | μοι ἀναιδείην ἐπιειμένε κερδαλέοφρον (<i>Il.</i> 1.149)
"my god, look at how you wear your impiety, you in your greedy-mind" |
| c. | οἶνοβαρές κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων, κραδίην δ' ἐλάφοιο (<i>Il.</i> 1.225)
"you drunken sot, you look like a dog, but have all the courage of a deer" |
| d. | 'Ατρείδη κύδιστε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον (<i>Il.</i> 19.146 κ.τ.λ.)
"Atreusson, the most glorious field marshal, Agamemnon" |
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Agamemnon parallels the deterioration and then reestablishment of their relationship as it develops across the poem (Friedrich 2–3).

He claims that the first of these addresses, 1.122 (a), seems intended to call to mind the perhaps "traditional" form of full-line address as seen in the last example at 19.146 *et aliis*.¹⁵ In this address, Akhilleus contrasts Agamemnon's social position, marked by the term κύδιστε, with his situationally expressed greed (*φιλοκτεανώτατε). I note that the second address 1.149 builds on Akhilleus's equation of Agamemnon with greed that he began at 1.122 and equates his greed with a lack of αἰδώς, "awe" or "reverence."¹⁶ In the third address at 1.225, Akhilleus moves away from direct reference to Agamemnon's most immediate and, from Akhilleus's standpoint, relevant flaw, greed, to a more general critique. Ὀἶνοβαρές at 1.225 implies that, for Akhilleus at least, Agamemnon's decision-making seems to bear all the hallmarks of that of a drunken man.¹⁷ Finally, Friedrich notes that, in this last example at 19.146, Akhilleus finally reestablishes his relationship with Agamemnon as that of the *status quo ante* (4–5). The use of unique lines like *Il.*1.122 and *Il.*1.225 constitute exceptional cases in Homer. While these lines do suggest that the poet may, in certain key situations, allow specific situational selection criteria (here, Akhilleus's anger at Agamemnon's army-destroying

¹⁴ This translation reflects the contention of this paper that the patronymic does not function as a descriptor but as a title.

¹⁵ Friedrich assumes, based presumably on Nagy's notion of a preexisting "tradition," that background knowledge of the story would inform the audience's reading of the poem. See Nagy 1979, Foley 1997, 1999.

¹⁶ See Cairns for a detailed treatment of this and related terms.

¹⁷ The term οἶνοβαρές might better be rendered here "are you drunk?"

philokteania) to influence his choice of forms, such selectional criteria can be seen to affect the poet in other, less-prominent cases of address as well. The poet of the *Iliad*, operating in a metrical context, did not simply choose between members of a preexisting set of terms of address based on metrical and grammatical considerations alone, but made his choices based on pragmatic considerations as well, such as Akhilleus's assessment of Agamemnon as a leader. In this paper, I will show how the poet's use of various forms of address for Agamemnon, which Parry believed to be exclusively *metri gratia*, reflect on and help build the social context in which they appear. Thus, an understanding of how these forms function in context will allow one to read that context more closely and with greater finesse than is allowed by a strict application of the Parry-Lord thesis.

Part of the problem that confronts the reader of the *Iliad*—or any literary work—is the impossibility of establishing with certainty the poet/author's selectional criteria (i.e., his intentions).¹⁸ Parry assumed these criteria were limited exclusively to meter, grammatical category, and the (given) essential idea. The counter-claim is that Homer's language is pragmatically sensitive in ways analogous to other language (i.e., spoken language). Even within a reading program that sees the Homeric poems as "traditional" or "oral," we should ask whether such a fixed, essentializing understanding of character is essential.

2. THEORY

2.1 *Pragmatics*

Before looking at Agamemnon specifically, it will be necessary to discuss some of the issues involved in interpreting the speech of characters in the *Iliad*. The argument here proceeds from a general model of language-use in which 1) speech, 2) immediate context, and 3) social role function in a cycle of mutual information. All three inform and are, in turn, informed by the others. The study of how language and language-use is influenced by, or interacts with, its context is usually referred to as "pragmatics" (Levinson 1–47, Blackmore 39–48). Collinge nicely describes pragmatics as "[the] study of [...] what

¹⁸ For the problems with intentionality see, for example, Barthes or Derrida. Derrida notes two problems with authorial intentionality for the reader (*interpreter*). First, readers do not have access to the mental states of authors/speakers, therefore, intentionality can only be inferred. Second, authors'/speakers' intentions are not always, if ever, consistent and/or monolithic. Speakers change their minds, and often an author/speaker do not have a fully consistent, well articulated intention. Nevertheless, the act of interpretation, both of speech and of writing, consists of (re)constructing *an* authorial intent.

utterances achieve in interactive communications; that is, with how speaker works on hearer in real exchanges" (1). For Grundy, pragmatics defines the systematic ways by which we decode indeterminacy (10). Thus, "pragmatics has to do with the distinction between what a speaker's words literally mean and what a speaker might mean by his words" (Grundy 3, quoting Atkinson, Kilby and Roca 217).¹⁹ For our purposes, pragmatics will be the study of the role of context in language use. That is, it will be the study of how context functions to shape what people say and how it works to determine how others interpret what has been said. Context is here defined as the nexus of social factors (role) and situational factors (setting). Social factors refer to how individuals perceive their relationships and interactions. Situational factors refer to the specifics of an interaction, including the physical setting, the time, and the purpose of the interaction. Obviously, the two are best not thought of as discreet. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that all three operators—speech, setting, and social role—function as parts of a single system.

In this system, *address*—the vocal recognition and identification of an addressee—because it is most easily and directly manipulable, plays a central role (see Hudson 107 and 120–131; Blackmore 47–8; Levinson 70–1 and 107–111). The centrality of address to a pragmatic analysis of language makes it ideal for a pilot study such as this. Address has both a demarcative and a constitutive function in speech. By naming or otherwise identifying the addressee (by *indexing* them), address indicates and invokes as present an intended recipient of speech at the same time as it helps orient speaker and addressee to each other. Because address functions within two matrices, that of the specific discourse itself and that of the social world of the participants, including their specific social roles, it affords one way of linking the former matrix to the latter directly.

Names and titles refer to identity and are used frequently to identify a particular addressee by indexing them, thereby allowing them to be specified out of a set of potential addressees in ways that purely pronominal forms of address such as "hey, you" cannot. However, this is not the only function for such forms of address. In many cases it may already be clear who the addressee is.²⁰ In such contexts, the use of lexically indexing address forms like names

¹⁹ Verschueren (6–7) states that pragmatics "gives insights into ... *the link between language and human life in general*. Hence [it is] also the link between linguistics and the rest of the humanities and social sciences."

²⁰ For example, where there is only one addressee, where the addressee is indicated, say, by gesture or facial expression, or where they have already been specified in some other fashion.

cannot be to specify the addressee, since they will already be specified. Other uses of address are suggested by the fact that in different situations, the “same” individual—ontologically—can be addressed by different forms of address. Thus, the former president can be addressed as *Mr. President*, *President Clinton*, *William*, *Bill*, or even *Bubba*. What changes when one or another of these forms of address is used is not the ontological identity of the person addressed, but the relationship that the speaker wishes to construct between themselves and that addressee and any audience of observers. Thus, address is used to classify the addressee socially as, for example, in-group or out-group, as friendly or not, as superior, inferior, or equal (Hudson 120–34; Brown & Levinson 107–11). The question examined here is whether social factors analogous to these can be seen to operate on word choice in the *Iliad*.²¹

2.2 Politeness

Speakers and their addressees act as individuals and construct specific, individual relationships, even in group settings. In spoken discourse there are two basic sets of related social factors that reflect the relationship between the speaker and the addressee. These social factors often determine which form of address is perceived by the speaker as appropriate at any given time. These are 1) the perceived degree of intimacy or familiarity felt to exist or desired to exist by speakers between themselves and their addressee, and 2) the perceived relative social position of those speakers to their addressee within some social hierarchy.²² One may conceive of these factors as two separate axes of relation—one of intimacy (i.e., social distance or degree of solidarity) and one of power. Note that familiarity and social position are not synonymous, although they do correlate. A third factor, related to the second, is the addressee’s specific social role. Thus, President Clinton can be addressed as “Mr. President” 1) because he has the specific status of having held the office of President of the United States, 2) because I know he has that status, and 3) because I wish to express that knowledge to him (and/or any potential audience), for any number of socially or discursively determined reasons, for instance, to indicate that my speaking to him is predicated on his role as the [former] president, etc. The specific so-

²¹ I am not yet claiming that such social mechanisms are necessarily portrayed as operating in the text of the *Iliad*, only that such a reading is not inconsistent with the text of the *Iliad*. Therefore, it is necessary to talk about “seeing” these mechanisms in the text rather than predicating their concrete existence. The current project then is one of *reading* the *Iliad*.

²² Although not specifically mentioned by Brown and Levinson, it is certainly the case that the degree of positive or negative feelings towards the other person also enters into the equation, which I label *disposition*.

cial role of President of the United States carries with it a concomitant higher position within the established social hierarchy. That is, status *is* significant to interaction and to how one is addressed. After Brown and Levinson (5–6) I label the phenomenon by which language reflects directly such social factors “politeness.” Thus, politeness is defined here as:

The (linguistic) manifestation of the social hierarchy which exists between speaker and addressee at some time *T* in terms of: 1) the social distance between the speaker and the addressee (distance or solidarity); 2) the power differential between the speaker and the addressee (power); and 3) The degree of imposition on the addressee involved in making the speech act.

Here, we can see how power—often positively correlated with deference—and intimacy are themselves related. Both reflect the speaker’s recognition of relative social position. Politeness, by this definition, is a heuristic for explaining the particular form of an utterance in a particular context by making reference to the social relationship that is felt to exist between the speaker and the addressee and to the effect that the speaker perceives that utterance will have on that relationship. This definition arises from the observation that, beyond making their desired speech acts, speakers also wish to achieve certain psychological or cognitive effects in their addressees, and to avoid others. For example, they are likely to desire that their requests are not just communicated, but agreed to. They usually want their apologies to be accepted, their warnings to be heeded, etc. Sometimes they may want to avoid angering their addressees, at other times they may want to anger them. They may wish sad news to be received with or without some anticipated degree of sorrow, and good news with or without some degree of elation. Thus, in making utterances, speakers desire two results: 1) to communicate clearly, and 2) to achieve some desired psychosocial state of affairs in their addressee. Speakers tailor their speech in order to reconcile the often conflicting needs of communicative efficiency and social regulation.

2.3 Face

In speaking to one another, speakers have needs beyond the mere conveyance of some piece of information. The term used most often to refer to the psychosocial needs of interactants is *face*.²³ This term, as a feature of a comprehensive theory of social and specifically linguistic interaction, was first developed by Erving Goffman in *Interaction Ritual*. Goffman developed

²³ See Goffman 5–6, Blum-Kulka 131–46, Culpeper 350–53, Leech and Matsumoto 404–25.

his notion of face out of its colloquial use in phrases like “lose face.” For Goffman, face was “[the] positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line [a pattern of acts expressing one’s view of the situation and the participants in it] others assume he has taken during a particular contact” (Goffman 5). Face is an image of the self, defined in terms of social attributes. It is constructed, in the process of interaction, by one’s interactants and not by one’s self. Social interaction then constitutes a commitment since it involves an externally constructed valuation of the self. One can lose or gain face but always/only in the presence of others. This concept of face was later expanded and developed by Brown and Levinson: “[b]y ‘face’ we mean something quite specific again: [people are] endowed with two particular wants—roughly the want to be unimpeded and the want to be approved of in certain respects” (Brown and Levinson 58).²⁴ It seems that in respect to their social identity, people want to feel approved of or be “liked,” and people want to feel free to act as they wish to act. Brown and Levinson thus posit two complementary aspects to face, which they then label “positive” and “negative,” respectively (61). Certain actions can present threats to either of these distinct aspects of face, or to both simultaneously. These are referred to as “face-threatening” activities (see Brown and Levinson 61–71). Actions can threaten either one’s own face or one’s interactant’s or both. The terms “negative” and “positive” face are perhaps not well chosen: the two aspects of face that Brown and Levinson propose are not, in fact, as strictly opposite as the terms that designate them seem to imply, rather they complement each other. Furthermore, it is not always possible, or desirable, to keep the two types of face distinct (as in the case of scolding or other types of assault). Nevertheless, as the two terms and their corresponding concepts are now well established in the literature, it seems necessary to maintain them here, albeit with some hesitation.²⁵ For this paper, after Brown and Levinson (62), I will propose the following definition of face:

The psychosocial manifestation of social worth:

- *Positive Face*: approval of one’s public-self (public image)
- *Negative Face*: perceived ability to engage freely in one’s activities

Thus, if Agamemnon is addressed in certain ways, but not in others, this can be equated with his characterization in the poem. These operate within the

²⁴ It is not altogether clear that these two wants are always distinguishable and it should become clear that many actions tend to violate or address both types of face simultaneously.

²⁵ Hudson 114 proposes the terms *Power Face* and *Solidarity Face*, respectively, but these terms have not gained wide currency.

metrical constraints of the verse, but we do not need to ascribe the distribution of address forms to meter alone; both factors interact in complex ways to determine the poet's choice.

However face is constituted, the cultivation and protection of that face is an important part of social interchange. Implicit in "protection" is the notion that one's face is potentially and variably fragile and subject to harm. Social interaction puts people in the position of having their social position negatively affected, say, by being insulted, embarrassed, beholden, etc. Hudson states that face is "linked to observable behavior" (231). For Agamemnon, and other characters in the *Iliad*, the performance of their social position consists of (among other things) not only their physical appearance, including their expression, their costume (e.g., armor), and other tangible appurtenances (e.g., *skeptra*) but also their histories and their words.

2.4 Examples

There are cases in Homer in which social role clearly determined the poet's choice of address. Thus, Agamemnon addresses Kalkhas as μάντι (*Il*.1.106):

μάντι κακῶν οὐ πῶ ποτέ μοι τὸ κρήγυον εἶπας.

Prophet of evils, you've never ever had anything favorable to say to me.

Since Kalkhas is a *mantis*, it seems reasonable that he is addressed as such here.²⁶ However, there is more to the picture than that. He is addressed here not just as μάντι but rather as μάντι κακῶν. Unless we assume that μάντι κακῶν and Κόλχαν could represent the same essential idea, and that the choice of the form at 1.106 is predicated solely on metrical grounds, the poet's selection in this passage seems to reflect not just simple identity but how we are to read Agamemnon's reaction to the seer. This makes sense if we consider Agamemnon's address in light of Kalkhas' previous speech in which Kalkhas has placed the blame for the plague squarely on Agamemnon's shoulders. Kalkhas is addressed by Akhilleus once, with the vocative Κάλχαν alone, at *Il*.1.86. There, Akhilleus offers his support as a defense against the implied and expressly expected threat of Agamemnon. The familiar address in the form of the given name alone therefore supports Akhilleus's friendly, and thence supportive, position. Note that μάντι (κακῶν) and Κάλχαν are metrically complementary (one cannot simply be substituted for the other).²⁷

²⁶ Kalkhas is the only character addressed as μάντι within the Homeric narrative although others, most notably Teiresias, are referred to as a *mantis* by the narrator.

²⁷ The clearest definition comes from Hock 28: "complementary distribution" means that "one [form] occurs where the other(s) cannot occur."

One could therefore claim that they are simply metrical variants of the same essential idea, namely, Kalkhas, in the vocative case. However, this tack forces us to assume that Kalkhas is invariably a *mantis kakôn* in the same way that Agamemnon is the leader of the whole Greek army or Akhilleus its best warrior. One must also ignore how well the phrase μάντι κακῶν fits the tone of Agamemnon's speech here and, since Kalkhas has just spoken, how redundant Κάλχαν would have been in this same context.²⁸ Forms such as μάντι κακῶν could constitute examples of what Parry called "particularized epithets" (Parry 119–120, 153–155).²⁹ However, this in turn points up the fact that the poet did, in fact, have the ability to employ such particularized forms when he needed and was not always hamstrung by meter in the way that Parry otherwise claimed. Once we have established this fact, a question immediately arises as to whether the poet was ever hamstrung in this way. Rather, it seems that the poet was able to manipulate both metrical and pragmatic information simultaneously in constructing his verses.

2.5 Social Role and Address

We can begin by comparing a set of line-final formulae for Agamemnon following the penthemimeral caesura.

All of the epithets in Figure 1 make reference to Agamemnon's social positions either as the son of Atreus or as leader of the Greek army at Troy (ἄναξ ἄνδρῶν). It is not necessary to assume, as Parry *et alii* do, that these epithets have been bleached of all meaning. His social and political position within the Greek *stratos* is actually an important factor in how the poet portrays him interacting with others. From the standpoint of the *Iliad*, what is essential, the fixed ontological person (Agamemnon), or the social entity (ἄναξ ἄνδρῶν), or both? Agamemnon does have other potential social roles which the poet could emphasize: he is the brother to Menelaos, an advisee of Nestor, a (hopeful) lover of Khryseis, an *ekhthros* of Akhilleus, a *polemios* of Priam. These roles do not replace that of commander-in-chief. However, by Parry's model it must be situationally unimportant which of these roles Agamemnon is enacting when he is addressed as Ἀτρεΐδῃ or as ἄναξ ἄνδρῶν. The reader is to see only the same "given" persona, Agamemnon. Agamemnon's social role is not invisible, just irrelevant. His internal, social complexity has been reduced to a singularity, his given essence. This essence, of course, has the potential effect of obscuring much of what makes Agamemnon particular.

²⁸ We know already whom Agamemnon is addressing.

²⁹ Parry, does concede the possibility for the "occasions when Homer does deliberately choose an epithet to complete the thought of his sentence (154)."

— ~ ~ — ~ ~ — //	{	Nom. εὐρὺ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
		Gen. Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο
		Dat. Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαῶν
		Acc. Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν
		Voc. ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον

Figure 1. Epithets for Agamemnon after the Penthemimeral Caesura

Agamemnon's social role as leader and his hubristic misuse of that power are central to the unfolding narrative of the *Iliad*.

There is another possibility: namely that what is at issue for the poem in a phrase like εὐρὺ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων is not Agamemnon *solus*,³⁰ but also εὐρὺ κρείων. That is, Agamemnon's role as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν might in fact be central to how he is portrayed in the *Iliad*. To test this proposition we might ask whether other characters like Diomedes or Menelaos would have been likely to treat the priest Khryses as Agamemnon did; whether Agamemnon's position within the Greek *stratos* is important when we consider Akhilleus's challenge in Book 1 or his attempt at murder. Agamemnon's singular *hubris* and his ability to exercise that *hubris* as commander-in-chief has the effect of compelling Akhilleus to withdraw from the war, thereby setting in motion the events that will ultimately lead to his death. Thus, Agamemnon's social role is a crucial component of how he is portrayed as acting and of how his actions affect others.

As Kalkhas alone is addressed as μάντι, so Agamemnon alone is addressed as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, although others are referred to by this term by the narrator, among them: Akhilleus 6 times, Menelaos 3 times, Nestor 3 times, Odysseus 35 times (*Odyssey* only), Priam 9 times, Ankhises, Aineias, Augeias, Eumelos, and Euphetes once each.³¹ This distribution provides *prima facie* evidence for a distinction between the contexts of the epic narrator and the intra-narrative "speeches." That is, there is a distinction between the poet's context and that of his characters (see Griffin 86). On the surface, the form ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν would seem to refer to some sort of political or military office.³² It

³⁰ See n. 5.

³¹ See n. 25. Note that Akhilleus is addressed by characters as ἄναξ (*Il.*9.276, 19.177) as is Menelaos (*Il.*23.588) on which, see below.

³² For example, the Linear B term *wa-na-ka* seems to refer to an individual who holds the supreme position within the various Mycenaean Greek states. See Ventris and Chadwick, and Hooker 1979.

is a common enough feature of languages that epithets which relate directly to high or supreme social position—like *Sire, your Majesty, your Honor, or Mr. President*—are severely and often formally restricted in terms of the situations in which they may be felicitously—or even legally—applied.³³ I suggest that it is because Agamemnon is the commander-in-chief of the Greek host that, in speeches contained within that narrative frame, he and he alone is addressed as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, while outside of the narrative of the *Iliad* but within the Epic tradition by which I am referring to the frame that contains the narrator’s voice (as opposed to that of his characters), the term has broader currency and may be more freely applied” should be replaced with, “I suggest that it is because Agamemnon is the commander-in-chief of the Greek host that, in speeches contained within that narrative frame, he and he alone is addressed as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν. On the other hand, this same term is more freely applied by the narrator to other characters within that narration. The term, ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, has greater currency within the world of the narrator than within the fictional world of the *Iliad*. Griffin has found that the language of the speeches more often contains references to abstract concepts, refers more to value judgments, and in general, concerns itself more with social matters than does the language of the narrator.

2.6 Authority in the *Iliad*

It is safe to say that there is no human culture that is not hierarchical. The hierarchy we find in the *Iliad* is marked as openly and, one might say, enthusiastically dynamic. For the heroes of the *Iliad*, relative social position is constantly on display and constantly subject to renegotiation.³⁴ The engine that drives the primary plot of the *Iliad* is one such hierarchical struggle, namely, that between Agamemnon and Akhilleus. The maintenance of, and struggle for, status, for position within a hierarchy, will turn out to be of extreme importance for any discussion of the effects of context on speech and address. This is all the more true since speech appears to be one of the primary means by which this social dynamic is negotiated in the *Iliad*. Thus, at 1.122, Akhilleus’s use of φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων for the expected ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον presents his evaluation of Agamemnon as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, which his subsequent speech goes on to show.³⁵

³³ See, *inter alios*, Dickey, especially Chapter 3; Fraser, Nolen, Bassett, Ervin-Tripp. See also Van De Walle for a discussion of Sanskrit parallels.

³⁴ It should be noted, however, that relative social position is almost never presented as successfully redefined or overturned, the two important exceptions perhaps being found in the *Odyssey*, i.e., Odysseus and Telemakhos.

³⁵ Friedrich 3 argues that this form of the address is traditional, since it is numerically much more common and since φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων depends on it for comparison.

Like all human cultures, the society depicted in the *Iliad* is hierarchical, but always subject to renegotiation. However, such renegotiation is not unrestricted. Thersites cannot compete with the *basileis* as Odysseus demonstrates (*Il.*2.243–277). Let me clarify this. There seems to be one primary social class distinction made in the poem, that between members of the elite on the one hand—referred to variously as *andres agathoi*, *esthloi*, *heroes*, and *basileis*—and the *laoi*.³⁶ In addition to this distinction, there is a set of characters whose social position is less clear, but who probably can be classed with the *laoi*, although they function in many respects like members of the elite; these include the *mantis*, Kalkhas, and the priest, Khryses.³⁷ The members of the *laoi*, however, with few exceptions like the case of Thersites, do not appear as individuated persons, but rather *en masse* or as anonymous members of that undifferentiated mass.

Among the elite *basileis*, social position seems to be determined, at least notionally, by the size of one's contingent, as Nestor states (*Il.*1.280–1):

εἰ δὲ σὺ κάρτερός ἐσσι, θεὰ δέ σε γείνατο μήτηρ,
ἀλλ' ὅ γε φέρτερός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσει.

Even if you're stronger, and the mother who bore you was a goddess,
still this one's more powerful, because he commands a larger force.³⁸

This lends a distinctly visual element to one's claim to position. All present can see the size of one's contingent. Note the equation of φέρτερος with τὸ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσειν.

The primary distinction within the elite class seems to be between Agamemnon on the one side, as the ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, and the remaining he-

³⁶ Sometimes as a collective singular, *laos*. Van Effenterre states that “[t]he *laoi* can equally well be soldiers of an army as members of any crowd. The only constant meaning one can ascribe to the term is that of an *undifferentiated*, and we might add, *subordinate mass* of people, viewed as being in an *inferior* or precarious position” (2, my emphasis). Thalmann rejects the notion of hard and fast class distinctions (88). Nevertheless, with the exception of Thersites' problematic case (see above), the *laoi* are never represented as speaking or acting as individuals, whereas the *basileis* are. The poet himself suggests this binary social distinction in Odysseus's paired speeches beginning at *Il.*2.190.

³⁷ See Higbie (6–27) for a very good discussion of the complexity of status as expressed by names.

³⁸ That is, the state of being φέρτερος is (partly) defined by having a larger contingent. This is reiterated in the catalogue by the narrator at *Il.*2.580 “... πολὺν δὲ πλείστους ἄγε λαούς.” Donlan rightly notes that the basis of Agamemnon's authority is actually “a complex of inheritance, remote divine sanction, age, personal wealth, and numbers of followers” (53) See also Rihll, *et alios*.

roes on the other.³⁹ However, as others have noted, Agamemnon's rule is not absolute.⁴⁰ Decisions are made collectively in the βουλή or elsewhere with the advice of others present. Thus, when Khryses seeks to get his daughter back from Agamemnon at the beginning of Book 1, he addresses all of the Greeks (*Il*.1.15):

... καὶ λίσσετο πάντας Αἰαχίδας,
Ἄτρεΐδα δὲ μάλιστα δῶω, κοσμήτορε λαῶν·

... and he petitioned all the Akhaians
but the two brothers Atreusson especially, who were the organizers of the army.

The narrator's description of Khryses' address enacts a hierarchy, but one that includes both τῷ Ἄτρεΐδᾳ and τοὺς πάντας Αἰαχίδας. In addition, as has been noted by Rihll—something that is of critical importance for the development of the plot—the division of γέρα, the spoils of war—the chief economic activity of the Greek army—is handled by the army itself and not by Agamemnon.⁴¹ When Agamemnon is compelled by Apollo to give up the girl Khryseis, he cannot simply compel the army to reappoint him a compensatory prize—as Akhilleus points out (*Il*.1.123–126)—but he must strong-arm one of the other leaders personally. Agamemnon's seizure of Briseis from Akhilleus is not enacted directly under the authority of the institution of commander, ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, but involves a personal exchange between individuals. The source of Agamemnon's authority lies in a combination of personal qualities (βασιλεύτερος) and personal relationships, not on an institutionalized posi-

³⁹ Agamemnon will make a similar claim himself at *Il*.9.160–61. Note that in describing the priest Khryses' supplication of the Greek army, the narrator joins the Artneidai together in a special position, which he contrasts with the rest of the Greek host (*Il*.1.15–16). In this paper, I will argue that, within the world created by the narrator, Agamemnon has a singular position. Nevertheless, the expedition to Troy, while under the command of Agamemnon, is for the sake of Menelaos. On the position of Menelaos *vis á vis* Agamemnon, see below.

⁴⁰ See especially Rihll.

⁴¹ There is actually contradictory evidence regarding this claim. At *Il*.9.330–3, Akhilleus states that Agamemnon collects the γέρα from the individual soldiers and then himself makes the distribution.

τάων ἐκ πασέων κειμήλια πολλὰ καὶ ἐσθλὰ
ἐξελόμην, καὶ πάντα φέρων Ἀγαμέμνονι δόσκον
Ἄτρεΐδῃ· ὃ δ' ὅπισθε μένων παρὰ νηυσὶ θεῆσι
δεξιόμενος διὰ παῦρα δασάσκετο, πολλὰ δ' ἔχεσκεν.

From all of these (cities) a lot of glorious booty
I seized it, and I took it all and gave it to Agamemnon
Atreusson. But he would wait behind, back by his swift ships
and he'd take it and distribute it by dribs and drabs, but keep most of it.

tion, and it is these that allow him to compel Akhilleus's compliance. Note, Athene stops Akhilleus from killing Agamemnon, not because he is ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, but because, she says, Hera loves them both equally (ἄμφω ὁμῶς ... φιλέουσά, *Il.*1.209). We can compare Agamemnon's actions with those of Khryses. The priest's vengeance on the Greeks is authorized and enacted by the god Apollo. Agamemnon acts against Akhilleus as an individual, because he is βασιλεύτερος. When he siezes Briseis, he is not acting specifically as ὁ ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν. His position does give him clout; however, that clout is not expressed through the agency of the army, but personally. Agamemnon sends his own heralds to take Briseis. That Agamemnon's actions in this regard are not "official," but personal, is suggested by the fact that his actions, in fact, do not go uncontested. Akhilleus is perfectly willing at first to attempt to kill him in order to prevent Agamemnon's actions and he is only restrained by the gods (*Il.*1.216–19). Agamemnon's position is summed up by Rihll (41):

No one, least of all Akhilleus, has been brought to the point where they think it is *inherently correct* to obey Agamemnon. This is obvious, for else the various leaders would not keep trying to justify his (and their own) positions, and Agamemnon would not need to try to persuade anybody. He could simply give orders and expect to be obeyed.⁴²

Rihll's point is perhaps a bit overstated. A certain degree of consensus facilitates rule, even in the case of a ruler who can "simply give orders and expect to be obeyed." The leader is always dependent on the consent of the ruled to some degree.⁴³ What is important about Rihll's point is that Agamemnon does not simply make decisions on his own and expect them to be carried out, as Akhilleus himself points out (*Il.*1.149–51):

μοι ἀναιδείην ἐπιειμένε κερδαλέοφρον.
πῶς τίς τοι πρόφρων ἔπεσιν πείθεται Ἀχαιῶν
ἢ ὁδὸν ἐλθέμεναι ἢ ἀνδράσιν ἴφι μάχεσθαι;

My god, look at how you wear your impiety, you in your greedy-mind.
how could any Akhaian who had any sense at all listen to you
and set out on your expeditions or fight your battles with real warriors?

⁴² Ultimately, Agamemnon's threat to take Briseis is permitted by the gods. This is evident when, for example, Athene prevents Akhilleus from killing Agamemnon (1.195); only then does Akhilleus relent. However, he relents to Athene, not Agamemnon directly.

⁴³ The rhetoric is most transparent in phrases like ποιμὴν λαῶν, "shepherd of the people." The history of the term points up the lord's dependence on the people since he serves, in this case, by protecting them. A parallel relationship can be seen in the derivation of the English term *lord* from OE *hlaford* itself from Pre OE **hlaf-ward*, literally "bread warden." The notion that the lord "serves" need not be fully played out in the actual relationship, but it is clearly there in the rhetoric of naming.

Agamemnon's actions, especially in respect to how the war is conducted, are not self-sanctioning. Rather, he consults with the other Greeks in the βουλή before action is taken. On the other hand, his wishes are never contradicted by the βουλή either. So, while Agamemnon's power is formally tempered, it is effectively absolute. His orders *are* obeyed, even by Akhilleus, who turns Briseis over. Nestor himself points to this contradiction in Agamemnon's authority (*Il.*2.79–82):

ὦ φίλοι Ἀργείων ἡγήτορες ἡδὲ μέδοντες
εἰ μὲν τις τὸν ὄνειρον Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλος ἔνισπε
ψευδὸς κεν φαίμεν καὶ νοσφιζοίμεθα μᾶλλον·
νῦν δ' ἴδεν ὃς μέγ' ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν εὔχεται εἶναι·

My dear Argive leaders and strategists
if anyone else of the Akhaians had told us this dream
we'd say he was deluded and reject it instead,
but the man who saw this one has the claim to be really the best of the Akhaians.

Agamemnon's dream-based intention should be turned from (νοσφιζοίμεθα μᾶλλον), but, because it comes through Agamemnon (ὃς μέγ' ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν εὔχεται εἶναι), they should follow its injunction. Agamemnon's authority is presented as a claim (εὔχεται εἶναι) that he himself makes and that overrides any appearances to the contrary.

Donlan notes a general tendency in the *Iliad* for individuals of different social standing to engage in what he calls leadership authority, which he defines as the “ability, recognized, claimed, or assumed to make decisions, issue orders, or suggest specific courses of action with the expectation that the[y] [...] will be persuasive to others” (52).⁴⁴ He notes that statistically, among the mortal characters, one has an 87% chance of having one's requests or demands agreed to (52). This is likely related to the fact that, with one exception, directives are made by members of the elite.⁴⁵ Donlan notes that part of the problem with understanding authority within the *Iliad* is that we find “a society in which the workings of the authority-system were neither

⁴⁴ That is, in respect to how authority is manifest in the *Iliad*, the relationship between persuasion and institutionally based authority is complex. However, authority is never merely institutional. Odysseus's different rhetoric for the *basileis* and the *andres demou* beginning at *Il.*2.190 and 200, respectively, suggests further how rhetoric, i.e., persuasion, is critical to the successful exercising of authority. Odysseus can turn the men back to the *boulē*; it is not clear that Agamemnon, at this point could have achieved the same effect. Batstone (personal correspondence) suggests the term *leadership* for authority predicated on persuasion.

⁴⁵ Thersites' speech in Book 2 should be read as a directive to leave.

precisely defined nor clearly stated” (51). Agamemnon’s authority is based on the personal relationships he has with the individual Greek leaders and is not simply institutional, nor is it absolute. Note that Akhilleus’s decision to withdraw from the host does not constitute a *coup d’ état*, but the severing of one individual relationship; the other Greeks don’t follow him.⁴⁶

2.7 AGAMEMNON’S AUTHORITY

Because of the limitations on his power, Agamemnon’s status as leader must be confirmed in some substantive way.⁴⁷ Social status needs to be manifest through the display of overt symbols of authority. Both Agamemnon and Khryses carry a staff (*skeptron*) that symbolizes, and so makes visible, their claim to a certain position. The importance of the *skeptron* for Agamemnon’s position is suggested in Book 2. As Agamemnon prepares to present his dream to the *stratos*, he is described as dressing, but not for war, since he does not put on his armor (*Il*.2.42–46). The last two items mentioned, however, his ξίφος ἀργυρόηλον and his σκῆπτρον πατρώιον, are here purely symbolic. They announce his position by referring to his military prowess and to his history.⁴⁸ However, in the case of both Agamemnon and Khryses, the efficacy of the *skeptron* as a symbol can be called into question. The narrator shows how the *skeptron* is the device that confirms and instantiates Agamemnon’s social position (*Il*.2.101–8, below). There appears to be an equation between the display of the symbol and the realization of one’s power and position (see Nagy 1997: 168):

ἔσθι σκῆπτρον ἔχων· τὸ μὲν Ἥφαιστος κάμε τεύχων.
 Ἥφαιστος μὲν δῶκε Διὶ Κρονίωνι ἄνακτι,
 αὐτὰρ ἄρα Ζεὺς δῶκε διακτόρῳ ἀργεῖφόντῃ·
 Ἑρμείας δὲ ἄναξ δῶκεν Πέλοπι πληξίπῳ,
 αὐτὰρ ὃ αὖτε Πέλοψ δῶκε Ἀτρεΐ ποιμένι λαῶν,
 Ἀτρεὺς δὲ θνήσκων ἔλιπεν πολύαρνι Θυέστῃ,
 αὐτὰρ ὃ αὖτε Θυέστ’ Ἀγαμέμνονι λείπε φορῆναι,
 πολλῇσιν νήσοισι καὶ Ἀργεῖ παντὶ ἀνάσσειν.

⁴⁶ Although his Myrmidons do follow him out of battle. That is, Akhilleus’s position *vis-à-vis* his own contingent may be more institutionalized, but that relationship is never developed in the poem.

⁴⁷ We have already seen Nestor’s claim that, in comparison to Akhilleus, Ἀγαμέμνων γε φέρτερός ἐστιν ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσει.

⁴⁸ Agamemnon’s history consists of the story of his own past and that of his family (*ancestry*). Both are bound up together for the Homeric hero. For Agamemnon, the son of Atreus, Akhilleus, the son of Peleus, Odysseus, the son of Laertes, their positions are linked to the story of their ancestors. The two are not separable.

He stood there holding the *skeptron* that Hephaistos labored on and made.
 Now Hephaistos gave this to Zeus, ruler of the House of Kronos;
 then, of course, Zeus passed it on to the messenger Argosdeath;
 now lord Hermes gave it to Pelops Horsegoat;
 then Pelops passed it on to Atreus, shepherd of the people.
 Now when Atreus died, he left it to wealthy Thyestes,
 then Thyestes left it to Agamemnon to wield,
 to rule the many islands and all of Argos.

Wielding the *skeptron*, τὸ φορῆναι, in this case equates to ruling, τὸ ἀνάσσειν, to being the ἄναξ, as the status of the verb ἀνάσσειν (cognate with the noun ἄναξ) suggests. However Akhilleus had already challenged, or flouted, the authority of this symbol at *Il.*1.234–239. Similarly, Agamemnon himself questions the efficacy of Khryses' staff (*Il.*1.26–28):

μή σε γέρον κοίλῃσιν ἐγὼ παρὰ νηυσὶ κιχέω
 ἢ νῦν δηθύνοντ' ἢ ὕστερον αὖτις ἰόντα,
 μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμη σκῆπτρον καὶ στέμμα θεοῖο·

Do not let me catch you beside my hollow ships, old man,
 don't hang around now, and don't come back again later either.
 No, that *skeptron* won't help you then, the god's emblem won't either.

Despite Khryses' symbols of position, Agamemnon threatens the old priest, not as a priest, but as a γέρων.⁴⁹ He then directly and strongly (μή ... οὐ) challenges the authority of Apollo's σκῆπτρον καὶ στέμμα. Agamemnon's actions here are similar in effect to Akhilleus' casting down of Agamemnon's *skeptron* later at *Il.*1.234. In both cases the authority of an individual is challenged via a symbol of his authority. In both cases, that symbol is linked directly to a god, as if it proclaimed that the holder's authority were sanctioned by that god. In the case of Khryses, his authority is invoked in the very act of challenging that authority. In fact, as Vodoklys suggests, Agamemnon's treatment of Khryses itself represents a display of his own position (17–37). His uncontested treatment of Khryses says that he can so treat him, despite the army's enthusiastic initial acceptance of his request. That he is not challenged in this action suggests that he is not challenged in his right to do so.

In the narrator's description of Agamemnon's *skeptron*, we can see the importance of another kind of self-presentation, the history (See *Il.*2.101–8 above).⁵⁰ Agamemnon's *skeptron* comes with a history and as such manifests

⁴⁹ Note, the metrically equivalent line initial sequence * μή σ' ἱερεῦ is not used. This suggests that Agamemnon's characterization of Khryses as merely "old man" is purposeful.

⁵⁰ A parallel example from the *Odyssey*, Telemakhos' narration of his family history for the disguised Odysseus (*Od.*16.117–120), is discussed by Higbie (147–8).

that history when it is displayed. What is more, this history consists of names, and so too Agamemnon's patronymic is also a display of that history, a history that apparently can be traced directly to the gods themselves. The story of Agamemnon's staff reinforces the importance of names as a claim to a history. When Akhilleus throws down Agamemnon's staff, he is rejecting that history as he rejects the position that flows from it.

This, then, suggests how important Agamemnon's names are and what significance they have when he is addressed with them. It seems that the patronymic functions like the *skeptron* to invoke Agamemnon's history and that that history is an important feature of how he and others construct his social position. Higbie states "the patronymic does not identify for the audience *which* Akhilleus, but reiterates for us Akhilleus' ancestry and its demands on him *or the implications that ancestry has for the speaker*" (Higbie 6, my emphasis). She then adds that "to be identified by a proper name and a patronymic is clearly to belong to the higher social class." Thus, according to Higbie, patronymics denote standing by indicating a significant history and by specifying that history. It is not that Thersites has no past—the narrator tells us that he was always deprecating Akhilleus and Odysseus (*Il.*2.220–21)—but from the standpoint of heroic culture, it is insignificant. For Agamemnon, unlike Akhilleus, such identification with his history will turn out to be almost obligatory.⁵¹

Social position in the *Iliad* is performed both by the individual and by their interactants. Agamemnon and Khryses perform it when they display their staves; Akhilleus and Agamemnon perform it when they reject those displays; and Glaukos and Diomedes perform it when they perform their histories and then accept the other's performance. Address, which Glaukos and Diomedes implicitly relate to history, performs a similar function.

Language is also an important way (perhaps the most important way) people display their social status, affiliations, and attitudes. Idiosyncratic aspects of speech like lexical choice, tone, amplitude, and speed of speech speak about our immediate states of mind and our attitudes to the current state of affairs. Visual and linguistic displays combine to project a social version of the person at the point of interaction, one's *face*. Sometimes, these are in contrast as in the case of Thersites who speaks as a *basileus* but whose right to speak as one is betrayed by his appearance and rejected by his audience

⁵¹ Another example of the importance of the history implicit in names for defining and negotiating position is the *xenia*-swap of Glaukos and Diomedes (*Il.*6.119–236). In this case, the whole social dynamics of the encounter change once the histories of the two warriors are revealed. Again, history helps define social position, and enemies become *xenoi*.

(see Thalmann 17). Agamemnon's language also manifests a social version of himself. By addressing Khryses as γέρων and by then making the threats he does, he not only constructs a version of himself as able to act in such a way, but he constructs a version of the priest as unable to prevent such treatment; furthermore, Khryses at first appears to accept these versions: ἔδεισεν δ' ὃ γέρων καὶ ἐπείθετο μύθῳ.⁵² It is not then the display of one's face *per se* that is ultimately important, but the acceptance or rejection of that display by others, and of particular importance for this study, the display of that acceptance or rejection. Akhilleus's rejection of Agamemnon's authority through the physical display of rejecting his staff represents one way this can be manifest. Address is another such display.

Language is one means, albeit a primary one, of marking social identity. What we can and cannot say, whom we can and cannot speak to, what we can and cannot call someone, all reflect and therefore make statements about our social position. What we can and cannot call someone, called *address*, is one area of language use particularly sensitive to social constraints and therefore particularly important for defining and redefining both speakers and addressees within their immediate social relationship. It is address, then, as a linguistic medium of social interaction and social negotiation that I am addressing in this study.

The term ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν seems to represent supreme position as it reflects Agamemnon's claim to that position. Agamemnon alone is addressed as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν. If this is the case, what are we to make of the fact that both Akhilleus (*Il.*9.33, 19.177) and Menelaos (23.588) are addressed by the unmodified term ἄναξ? The distribution of this form of address among the mortal recipients in the poem is notable. At *Il.*9.33 and 19.177, Akhilleus is addressed as ἄναξ by Odysseus in his attempt to persuade him to return to battle. In both of these addresses, Odysseus is acting as Agamemnon's agent and bears Agamemnon's message of reconciliation, not his own. Agamemnon needs Akhilleus to return to battle, and desperate times, it seems, require desperate measures. Agamemnon's desperation is suggested by his admission of fault (*Il.*9.115–6) and his lengthy and elaborate ransom (*Il.*9.122–156). Odysseus's addresses to Akhilleus can then be read as delivered under Agamemnon's sanction in highly unusual situations. Odysseus's address can be read as an attempt to persuade since it appeals to Akhilleus' positive face (his social image) by implying the kind of status not implicit in the use of the given name. Odysseus's use of the address ἄναξ does not signal his own deference, since he speaks for Agamemnon, nor does it signal Agamemnon's, since he does not

⁵² 1.33, 'But the old man grew afraid and obeyed his *mythos*.'

deliver the address personally. Thus, the address serves in these cases only to signal elevated status. Menelaos is addressed as ἄναξ at *Il.*23.588. Antilokhos is apologizing for his rash and dangerous actions that cost Menelaos a prize and nearly his life in the chariot race (*Il.*23.429–37). As Richardson points out, Antilokhos's appeal is based on his youth (Richardson 233). The contrast Antilokhos invokes then is between his own youth (νεώτερός εἰμι *Il.*23.587) and Menelaos's superior position (ἄναξ). Deference is a key component of Antilokhos's rhetoric. Deference, then, while not homologous with higher status, is correlated with it.

It then seems necessary to include pragmatically defined aspects of identity (such as social role) within the set of features that make up character. In general, pragmatically defined aspects of identity, like social role, are constantly subject to change and therefore cannot be part of one's essence, i.e., essential. Furthermore, by comparing the voice of the narrator of the *Iliad* with the speech of the characters within that narration, we are compelled to call social role a pragmatically determined feature even of Homeric identity. Identity is defined differently within the narrative world of the *Iliad* in the voices of the poem's characters from how it is defined within the frame of the poem as a whole, as represented by the voice of the narrator. Thus, social roles, like μᾶντις or ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, seem to be an important part of how characters like Kalkhas or Agamemnon are defined socially within the world of the *Iliad*. This is different from how a characteristic like "swift-footedness" is essential to Akhilleus or "twisted-council-possession" is to Odysseus. While Agamemnon may be only provisionally ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, within the world of the Greek *stratos*, Achilles is always "swift-footed." Agamemnon alone is addressed as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν by characters within the narrative world of the poem, while outside that frame the narrator often refers to others by this same epithet. However, in both frames, only Akhilleus is ever ποδῶκης. This suggests that what is essential for Homer, the poet (or better the voice of the narrator), differs from what is essential for his characters.

3. AKHILLEUS

Agamemnon is a singular and anomalous character in the *Iliad*, as Nestor himself notes at 2.80–1 (see above). It is his exceptional, one might say heroic, *hubris* that sets in motion and drives along the sequence of events that will soon engulf him and the whole Iliadic world, and that will lead directly to the deaths of Patroklos and Hektor, and ultimately prefigure the death of Akhilleus. In a sense, Agamemnon's *hubris* lies behind the whole violent, tragic plot of the *Iliad*. Just as Agamemnon is unusual narratologically, he is unusual socially, and because he is the commander-in-chief of the whole Greek

army, he holds a singular position in the society of that army. Therefore, the findings of an investigation into address forms used to refer to Agamemnon should be first considered against those of a test case, another character, one who is not portrayed in a position of supreme authority.

Exploring the example of address to Akhilleus conveniently allows us to examine a case in which two metrically parallel forms of address are applied to the same character. David Shive has noted that the two vocative phrases Πηλεΐδῃ (*Il.*20.200, 431; 21.153, 288) and ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ (*Il.*1.74; 21.214; 23.543) are metrically equivalent in line-initial position (115–16). In addition to those cases where the two address forms are used separately, we find two instances of ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ used with the patronymic Πηληϊός υἱέ (*Il.*16.21; 19.216). Since these forms are metrically equivalent, meter alone *cannot* have been a factor in the poet's choice between one or the other of these two forms of address. The distinction of form could have some social or discourse-specific, pragmatic explanation. This hypothesis is, in fact, testable.⁵³

Akhilleus is addressed as ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ by the seer Kalkhas, *Il.*1.74; by Antilokhos, *Il.*23.543; by Patroklos, *Il.*16.21; by Odysseus, *Il.*19.216, and by Skamandros, *Il.*21.214. On the other hand, he is addressed as Πηλεΐδῃ by Aineias, *Il.*20.200; by Hektor, *Il.*20.431; by Asteropaios, *Il.*21.153, and by Poseidon,

⁵³ There are a few possible explanations for such data, some of which must suffer the burden of proof. The distinction could be the result of interpolation, e.g., because of multiple authors or multiple editors/redactors. Thus, Πηλεΐδῃ could be a gloss for ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ, although such an interpretation is difficult to justify. The distinction could simply be the result of *variatio* on the part of the poet.

TABLE 2. FREQUENCY OF FORMS OF ADDRESS FOR AKHILLEUS: PATRONYMIC AND GIVEN-NAME⁵⁴

<i>Form of Address for Akhilleus</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
'Αχιλλεῦ	16 times total
'Αχιλλεῦ alone	4 times
'Αχιλλεῦ + epithet	12 times
'Αχιλλεῦ + patronymic	0 times
'Αχιλεῦ	11 times total
'Αχιλεῦ alone	9 times
'Αχιλεῦ + epithet and patronymic	2 times
Πηλεΐδη	7 times
Πηλέος υἱέ	7 times

*Il.*21.288.⁵⁵ In the case of ὦ Αχιλεῦ and Πηλεΐδη, where meter cannot be a factor in the poet's choosing one over the other, the patronymic is used by Trojans or Trojan allies and by Poseidon; the given name is used by Greeks and by the god-river Skamandros. Leaving the two gods aside,⁵⁶ we can say that, in line-initial, choriambic position, Akhilleus is addressed by his given name by characters who can be fairly designated as friends or allies; on the other hand, he is addressed with his patronymic by Trojan enemies. Specifically, he is never addressed as ὦ Αχιλεῦ by Trojans. In the case of Akhilleus, pragmatic factors correspond to the poet's choice between the metrically parallel forms of address ὦ Αχιλεῦ and Πηλεΐδη. The given name Αχιλ(λ)εῦ can perhaps be correlated with a greater degree of intimacy on the part of the speaker towards the addressee than the corresponding patronymics. That is to say, in the case of Akhilleus, the poet seems to be making a social distinction, since he is not making a metrical one.

⁵⁴ All numbers are based on the text of Allen, along with the concordances of Dee, Pendergast, and Tebben. However, the texts of West and van Thiel have also been consulted and their readings adopted if better.

⁵⁵ For a comparison of forms of address for Agamemnon between given name and patronymic, see Table 3.

⁵⁶ This will be addressed in more detail in a forthcoming paper.

4. AGAMEMNON

4.1 *The Distribution of Forms of Address*

As stated above (see Table 1, above), Friedrich has noted an analogous situation involving apparently discourse-specific factors in the poet's choice of four verse-long addresses for Agamemnon. As Friedrich notes, "[Akhilleus's] sarcastic and insulting addresses respond perfectly to their respective contexts: they open speeches which mark the development of the quarrel-scene" (Friedrich 3). In addition, the three unique lines respond specifically to the first line's reflection of Agamemnon's social role as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, either by critiquing it (φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων) or by contradicting it (ἔχων κραδίην ἐλάφοιο). In all three cases, Agamemnon's situation-specific social role, not his essential identity, is what is under critique by Akhilleus. The contrast between 19.146 and 1.122 and 1.149 suggests that Akhilleus is moved to criticize Agamemnon's leadership specifically in the case of the priest.

The next step is to examine the two forms of address for Agamemnon mentioned at the beginning of this paper that were analogous to the forms Πηλείδῃ and ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ, i.e., Ἀτρείδῃ and Ἀγάμεμνον. Unlike these two vocative forms of address for Akhilleus, the addresses for Agamemnon are metrically complementary and cannot simply be substituted.⁵⁷ On the other hand, they are not simply metrical variants of the same form as in the case of Ἀχιλλεῦ and ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ (Table 2). Ἀτρείδῃ and Ἀγάμεμνον are distinct lexical items and therefore potentially sensitive to pragmatic constraints on use. The former reflects Agamemnon's history and hence his claim to κλέος and position, while the latter does not, at least not directly.⁵⁸

The distribution of the forms Ἀτρείδῃ and Ἀγάμεμνον, however, stands in contrast to that of Πηλείδῃ and ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ, the analogous forms for Akhilleus. Agamemnon is addressed as Ἀτρείδῃ 36 times, 25 times with no other epithet or indication of identity, and twice by the metrical-variant form Ἀτρός υἱέ. He is addressed as Ἀγάμεμνον alone only once at *Il*.2.363. This distribution is striking and contrasts with what we see in the case of Akhilleus (Table 3). Agamemnon is addressed with the patronymic 36 times, three times by the variant Ἀτρός υἱέ. He is addressed with the term ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν 10 times and as just ἄναξ 4 times. The given name appears as an address 10 times but with the patronymic or the term ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν or both in all but one case, *Il*.2.363. If the choice of one address form over another were strictly

⁵⁷ See n. 19.

⁵⁸ Observe how Akhilleus directly challenges Agamemnon's historical claim to position at 1.122, by using his patronymic in a critical way.

TABLE 3. FREQUENCY OF FORMS OF ADDRESS FOR AGAMEMNON AND AKHILLEUS COMPARED

<i>Forms of Address for Agamemnon & Akhilleus</i>	<i>Loci</i>
Ἀτρεΐδῃ κύδιστε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον	8 times
Ἀτρεΐδῃ	25 times
cf. Πηλεΐδῃ	7 times
Ἀτρεΐδῃ κύδιστε	Twice, 1.122; 8.293
Ἀτρεΐδῃ ... ἄναξ	Once, 2.284
Ἀτρέος υἱέ	Twice, 2.32, 60
cf. Πηλέος υἱέ	7 times
ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον	Once, 23.49
ἄναξ	3 times, 2.284, 360; 9.33
* Ἀγάμεμνον alone	Once, 2.363
cf. (ῶ) Ἀχιλ(λ)εῦ alone	13 times
Ἀχιλ(λ)εῦ + epithet	14 times
Ἀχιλ(λ)εῦ + patronymic	2 times

metrically determined, we should expect the three variants, ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, Ἀτρεΐδῃ, and Ἀγάμεμνον to show more or less equal distribution—consider the distribution of the pairs Ἀχιλεῦ and Ἀχιλλεῦ vs. Πηλεΐδῃ and Πηλέος υἱέ (see Table 2, above). In this light, it becomes difficult to argue that the distribution of the forms Ἀτρεΐδῃ and Ἀγάμεμνον is necessarily determined on metrical grounds alone.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Note that the vocative epithet Ἀγάμεμνον is, in fact, attested eight times in the full line address Ἀτρεΐδῃ κύδιστε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον, and once in the half line address ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον. Therefore, its rarity as a singleton form cannot be explained by recourse to any features of the Parry-Lord model. The address form Ἀγάμεμνον can appear in line-final position by itself; but, with the one exception discussed below, never does.

This distribution is striking. Agamemnon is practically never addressed except with his patronymic or with the title of his office, namely ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, included in that address. He is, with one exception, never addressed simply as Ἀγάμεμνον. For Agamemnon, the given name, especially in isolation, is the marked member of the set of available terms of address, and the marked member is the term that is not associated directly with high status. This fact suggests that for Agamemnon, within the context of the *Iliad*, status, particularly in relation to ancestry and office, is of great importance for defining his social persona. Much of the action of the *Iliad*—Agamemnon’s treatment of Khryses, his ongoing feud with Akhilleus, his nearly disastrous test of the men in Book 2—stems from his concern for his position and for the display of that position, particularly in the form of γέρα. The nearly obligatory use of the patronymic or the title ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν suggests that Agamemnon occupies a social position wherein a restriction on available forms of address is impossible and imposed. This in turn suggests social distance and greater power. This implies that the patronymic functions *vis-à-vis* the given name to suggest greater social distance on the part of that addressee and the address Ἀτρεΐδῃ is better seen as reflecting that distance and should be rendered as such.

4.2 *Iliad* 2.363, An Exception

To test the generalization I have laid out above, let us turn now to that one exception where Agamemnon is addressed with his given name Ἀγάμεμνον alone, *Iliad* 2.363. This address comes in a speech by Nestor, which begins at 2.337, reproaching the *laoi* and addressing how to proceed with the war preparations in light of Agamemnon’s earlier, disastrous test of the men’s commitment. Nestor’s speech is somewhat problematic, as Kirk has noted (Kirk 1985: 150–51). In it, Nestor begins by haranguing the Greeks for their childishness and lack of reliability. Kirk’s claim that Nestor’s harangue is now unnecessary in light of the reception of Odysseus’s speech at *Il.*286–332 is somewhat overstated. While it is true that Odysseus’s speech has the intended effect of successfully rallying the troops, nevertheless, in light of the near disastrous outcome of Agamemnon’s hubristic test beginning at *Il.*2.110, it is clear that the desire of the army to desert is still a theoretical threat, thus Nestor returns to it twice in his speech. In fact, the beginning of his speech is clearly a response to Odysseus’s previous speech, which the men have responded to loudly and positively (*Il.*2.333–35), “praising Odysseus’s words” (μῦθον ἐπαινῆσαντες Ὀδυσσεύος, *Il.*2.335). Nestor begins, somewhat peevishly, by rebuking the men (ὦ πόποι, *Il.*2.336). They conduct their assembly, he says, “like children” (ἐοικότες ... νηπιόχοις, *Il.*2.335–6). For Nestor, it seems, the army’s dependability is still very much an issue. This issue of the army’s reli-

ability is central to Nestor's rhetoric. He concludes his speech with advice about how to test the men. Before Agamemnon begins operations, he needs to be sure of the their reliability, and Nestor has a new and different plan to test just this.

At 2.344, he turns to Agamemnon. He then begins giving advice as to what they should do next. This new advice will ultimately lead up to the catalogue of ships beginning at 2.492. That Nestor's address turns to Agamemnon specifically at *Il.*2.344 is signaled, as we should now expect, with the vocative of the patronymic Ἀτρεΐδης (*Il.*2.344–49, 354–67).

Ἀτρεΐδῃ σὺ δ' ἔθ' ὥς πρὶν ἔχων ἀστεμφέα βουλὴν
ἄρχεν' Ἀργείοισι κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας,
τοῦσδε δ' ἔα φθινύθειν ἓνα καὶ δύο, τοί κεν Ἀχαιοῶν
νόσφιν βουλεύωσ'· ἄνυσις δ' οὐκ ἔσσεται αὐτῶν·
πρὶν Ἄργος δ' ἰέναι, πρὶν καὶ Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο
γνώμεναι εἴ τε ψεῦδος ὑπόσχεσις εἴ τε καὶ οὐκί.
[...]

τὼ μὴ τις πρὶν ἐπειγέσθω οἶκόν δε νέεσθαι
πρὶν τινα παρ Τρώων ἀλόχῳ κατακοιμηθῆναι,
τίσασθαι δ' Ἑλένης ὀρμήματά τε στοναχὰς τε.
εἰ δέ τις ἐκπάγλως ἐθέλει οἶκόν δε νέεσθαι
ἀπτέσθω ἥς νηὶς εὖσσελμοιο μελαίνης,
ὄφρα πρόσθ' ἄλλων θάνατον καὶ πότμον ἐπίσπῃ.
ἀλλὰ ἄναξ αὐτός τ' εὖ μήδεο πεῖθεό τ' ἄλλω·
οὐ τοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος ἔσσεται ὅττι κεν εἴπω.⁶⁰
κρὶν' ἄνδρας κατὰ φύλα, κατὰ φρήτρας, Ἀγάμεμνον,
ὥς φρήτρη φρήτρηφιν ἀρήγῃ, φύλα δὲ φύλοις.
εἰ δέ κεν ὥς ἔρξης καὶ τοι πεῖθονται Ἀχαιοί,
γνώσῃ ἔπειθ' ὅς θ' ἡγεμόνων κακὸς ὅς τέ νυ λαῶν
ἦδ' ὅς κ' ἐσθλὸς ἔρσι· κατὰ σφέας γὰρ μαχέονται.

Atreuson, just like before, keep your plan unshaken
and be a leader for the Argives as they head down into the crush of battle;
but these ones here, let them perish, the one or two who
make their own plans apart from us Akhaians, we will get no use from them.
Let them go back to Argos before they learn from aegis-bearing Zeus
whether his promise were false or not.
[...]

Thus, let no one be anxious to return home
before he has taken some Trojan's wife

⁶⁰ Kirk (1985, Vol. 1 155) describes these two lines (i.e., *Il.*2.360–61) as “a solemn introduction.”

and paid them back good for our suffering and for Helen's wandering ways;
 but if some fool wishes to return home,
 let him take his own black and well-benched ship
 so, in sight of all the others, he may meet death, his fate.
 But, *Anax*, reflect yourself and take the advice of another,
 don't cast aside what I say lightly either.
 Now arrange the men, *Agamemnon*, according to tribe and *phratre*
 so tribe can back up tribe and *phratre*, *phratre*.
 If you do this, and if the Akhaians will listen to you,
 you will know then which commander is *kakos*
 and which is *esthlos*, since they will be fighting on behalf of their own.

In this speech, Nestor begins with advice that might best be characterized as general, but which, nevertheless, reflects his anxiety about Agamemnon and the reliability of the army: "keep an unshakable plan," "lead the Argives down into the throes of battle," "let them die who make plans on their own." His use of the address Ἀτρεΐδῃ fits with this portion of his speech. Nestor seems here to be appealing to Agamemnon specifically as leader and before the assembled host. Nestor's rebuke of the men contrasts with the majesty he applies to the son of Atreus. The men are like children, *νηπιᾶχοι*, the son of Atreus has an unshakable plan, ἄσπεμφέα βουλὴν. The use of the patronymic allows Nestor to relate publicly Agamemnon's implied unshakable plan to a history-generated image. Nestor's use of ἄναξ at *Il*.2.360 serves a slightly different purpose. Here Nestor is preparing Agamemnon for the new plan to come. The use of a contextually martial address focuses our attention on Agamemnon as general. Both terms, Ἀτρεΐδῃ and ἄναξ, by appealing publicly to Agamemnon's positive face, can be seen to reinforce his position in the eyes of the army. Although one might argue that Nestor is simply varying his address, the trajectory, from House of Atreus to general, follows the tack of Nestor's argument, and is not just a case of *variatio*.

When Nestor re-addresses Agamemnon with his given name, the advice he gives him now is specific. More importantly, as it pertains directly to testing the men's reliability and dedication, this advice cannot be for general consumption. Just as at the beginning of the speech, these lines reflect Nestor's concern about the men.⁶¹ It is not that the men cannot know that they will be arranged by tribe and *phratre*; they will know this as soon as the order has been given. What they cannot know is that this order has been given to test their reliability in light of the previous test. In order for such a test to work in practice, its reasons must not be made known. Both the beginning and

⁶¹ See note in Kirk (*ibid.*) on *Il*.2.365–8.

end of this speech can be read as showing Nestor's concerned state of mind, the beginning harangue directed at the men, the closing confidential advice at Agamemnon alone. Nestor's new test will replace Agamemnon's failed test as it settles the fears reflected in the opening of his speech.

I suggest that the familiar form of address marks this part of Nestor's speech, beginning at *Il.*2.362, as an aside meant for Agamemnon alone. The failure to use forms of address which acknowledge Agamemnon's social position and hence his positive face, if made publicly, could be read as a threat to that face. But in a more intimate context, it can be read as reflecting Nestor's claim to *negative face*, and hence to the right to give advice to the younger superior. The shift from address by title to address by given name (re)constructs the social space within which the rest of Nestor's discourse will now take place. The use of the given name alone, because its distribution is as statistically marked as it is, in fact helps us, as the audience, read this portion of the speech as Nestor's attempt to build a more intimate and focused frame for the following discourse. This discourse, in fact, must be more intimate in order for it to work. Nestor's advice needs to be given in secret; his use of the given name suggests to us that it *is* given in secret. This is because, in the *Iliad*, for another Greek to address Agamemnon in this way appears to violate the social constraints on address to him. Nestor's use of the familiar address does this because we know that Agamemnon is not addressed solely as Ἀγάμεμνον in any other instance. That the other Greeks never seem to be able to address Agamemnon in this way, and the fact that Nestor so addresses him *only here*, combine to suggest that Nestor's address is special, singular. What is more, it is special specifically in terms of its degree of intimacy. It is not just the uniqueness of this form of address, but the way in which it is odd, that suggests that the rest of Nestor's speech is meant to be read as one that is not made openly. Form and context combine to inform our reading of Nestor's speech. Other Greeks, such as Akhilleus, can be addressed more freely by their given name within their own social group. Since overt deference is less critical for the maintenance of their social position, this would seem to suggest they occupy lower, and hence less vulnerable positions within the hierarchy of the Greek *stratos*. Because Agamemnon holds more power, because of his singular position as commander-in-chief, his social and political position is more vulnerable, and so, deference to him is qualitatively different and constructs a unique social space for him to act in his capacity as *anax*. Further, because Agamemnon's position is not clearly institutional but is, to some degree, dependent on his ability to appear as *anax*, overt displays of position, such as displays of deference, are likely to be very important to his character, in ways that are not so for characters like Akhilleus.

Agamemnon's immediate reply to Nestor bears this out. *Il.*2.370 is clearly addressed to Nestor alone, and Agamemnon does not switch to address the assembled host again until he switches to the plural at *Il.*2.381, νῦν δ' ἔρχεσθ'. Agamemnon's reply to Nestor is basically, "you're right, I wish I had ten advisors like you, then I'd take Troy; Zeus made me fight with Akhilleus; I wish he were here now." The use of γέρον at *Il.*2.370 for Νηληϊάδῃ continues the closed circle of discourse started by Nestor at *Il.*2.362. The prayer form which follows at *Il.*3.371, with its implied third-person reference to Nestor can be read as for his benefit, "Zeupater and Athene and Apollo, I sure wish I had ten like *him*." One can almost picture the knowing glance. Indirect praise such as this implies a public performance, this time before the gods, and thus addresses the recipient's positive face; he is praiseworthy before the gods. Thus, Agamemnon's address to Zeus, Athene, and Apollo can still be read as primarily addressed to Nestor.

4.3 Intimacy and Address

Let me be clear here. The given name *qua* address does not in-and-of-itself mark an address as more intimate. Agamemnon is often addressed by his given name, but always in conjunction with either the patronymic or some other title.⁶² If the given name itself always implied greater intimacy, then those addresses which contained both the given name and one of the more deferential terms of address would be internally inconsistent, which would have further social implications.⁶³ Addresses that are characterized in this way (e.g., *my darling Mr. President*) usually seem to imply that the more intimate force of the address "trumps" the more deferential and also seems to have the further implication that the speaker claims specifically to be able to trump the more deferential address. By such an address, the speaker constructs a social position in which deference is not only unnecessary but is overtly rejected—overtly, because the deferential form is retained. It is the absence of a specifically deferential term of address, rather than the presence of a specifically intimate term, such as the patronymic, which implies intimacy. Lack of deference where deference is expected ascribes a lack of superior status to

⁶² Compare the metrically and formulaically possible but unattested alternate to 2.363:

* κρῖν' ἄνδρας κατὰ φύλα ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον,

Such a line would satisfy the metrical needs of the poet and allow him to retain the epithet ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν.

⁶³ Addresses like φίλ' Ἀτρεΐδῃ *vel sim.* are not attested in the *Iliad*. Note that something similar happens at *Il.*1.122 with κύδιστε and φιλοκτεανώτατε, where, by the latter, Akhilleus makes specific claims about the appropriateness of Agamemnon's claim to *kudos*, namely that his greed (*φιλοκτεανία) now competes with and trumps it.

the addressee and can have a number of further potential and contextually determined implications. In the case of the older Nestor (who already has some degree of age-defined status) imparting advice to the younger Agamemnon, the implication is clear and further defines a setting in which this advice can be most felicitously given, namely, in secret.

The example in *Il.*2.363 points up an important aspect of address. In forming an utterance, speakers consider not only the potential impact of their statement on the specific addressee, but also its impact on other bystanders who may perceive it. Thus, Nestor's desire to address Agamemnon as Ἀτρεΐδῃ or Ἀγάμεμνον may derive not only from his desire to construct a specific social space between himself and Agamemnon, but a desire to be perceived by others as constructing such a space. As Verschueren says, "The form which [one] gives his utterance may ... be inspired by what he expects the reactions to be on the part of any known presence" (82).⁶⁴ Since any utterance may take place in the presence of (non-)participating bystanders, the social space constructed by it takes place within a larger social space that includes those bystanders.⁶⁵ In the case of Homer's Nestor, since he is allowed to address Agamemnon as Ἀγάμεμνον (note, he is not reproached at this point for being too familiar), his use of the patronymic in other contexts seems contrastive and may therefore be understood as reflecting a primary concern for that larger, more general social space that includes the other Greek leaders as bystanders. Support for this reading of the social/cultural import of the patronymic as a mark of status in Homer comes when one considers additional facts regarding the distribution of this form of address as applied to his brother, Menelaos.

5. MENELAOS

In the *Iliad*, Menelaos is addressed along with his brother as Ἀτρεΐδαι in the plural at *Il.*1.17 and *Il.*7.385.⁶⁶ The address, while formally plural, is functionally directed at Agamemnon alone—or at least primarily so. Menelaos is addressed as Ἀτρεΐδῃ in the singular only once in the *Iliad*, at *Il.*17.12 (below), and not by a Greek but by the Trojan, Euphorbos, as he stands guarding the fallen body of Patroklos whom he has killed and is intending to despoil (*Il.*17.12–17):

⁶⁴ Verschueren defines "presence" as "[a person] who [is] 'present' at or in the vicinity of a speech event or, put differently, in a position that would enable them to become engaged in the event" (82).

⁶⁵ Cf. Goffman. We can expect that a poet with "an ear" for characterization would be aware, if intuitively, of this.

⁶⁶ The latter is omitted by many Mss. and is found in the variant Ἀτρεΐδῃ in most others. See Allen, Vol. I, 150.

Ἄτρεΐδῃ Μενέλαε διοτρεφὲς ὄρχαμε λαῶν
 χάζεο, λείπε δὲ νεκρόν, ἕα δ' ἕναρα βροτόεντα·
 οὐ γάρ τις πρότερος Τρώων κλειτῶν τ' ἐπικούρων
 Πάτροκλον βάλε δουρὶ κατὰ κρατερὴν ὑσμίνην·
 τὸ με ἕα κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἐνὶ Τρώεσσιν ἀρέσθαι,
 μὴ σε βάλω, ἀπὸ δὲ μελιγδέα θυμὸν ἔλωμαι.

Atreusson, Menelaos, the Zeus-reared, organizer of the army,
 best just back off and give up the corpse; leave the bloodied spoils as well,
 no other Trojan ever before, and none of their glorious allies either
 ever got Patroklos with his spear in the throes of battle.
 So leave this fitting glory to me, I am the only Trojan who deserves to win it,
 don't make me kill you; don't make me take away your honey-sweet life.

Here, Euphorbos expresses his desire not to let Menelaos deprive him of the glory of despoiling Patroklos of Akhilleus's armor. This address is performed in the presence of his fellow Trojans as well as the opposed Greeks. The use of the patronymic Ἄτρεΐδῃ for Menelaos conforms to what we have seen for Akhilleus, above. Namely that the surname is not used by members of the same social group, but by out-group members.

Akhilleus and Menelaos, within their own social group (the Greek *stratos*), are addressed by the more intimate and familiar form of the given name—obligatorily so for Menelaos it seems—and hence participate in more intimate and familiar relationships with their fellow Greeks. Agamemnon seems to be defined by those who address him as obligatorily participating in less intimate, more distanced relationships with members of that same social group. Agamemnon's relationships appear to be defined as less intimate, more distanced than even those of Menelaos on whose behalf the entire expedition and war with Troy has been undertaken.

6. A WRINKLE

When, in Book 11 of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus is visiting the underworld, after speaking with his mother and seeing Alkmene and Epikaste and other ψυχὰς ... γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων (“the spirits of the more feminine women” *Od.* 11.385–6),⁶⁷ he sees the spirit of Agamemnon. Odysseus is surprised and saddened and addresses him (*Od.* 11.395–97):

⁶⁷ This epithet appears in *Theogony* 590, often athetized (cf. West 1966: 329), where it is applied to that race of women descended from the Maiden (πάρθενος αἰοΐδη). While the comparative form may not be comparative in function—cf. forms like ἡμέτερος, etc. where the affix *-ter-* does not imply comparative degree—it is not clear that it does not have this force here.

τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ δάκρυσα ἰδὼν ἐλέησά τε θυμῷ,
καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδων·
“Ἀτρεΐδῃ κύδιστε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον.”

That one, when I saw him, I wept and I pitied him in my heart,
And I gave voice and spoke winged words to him;
“Most glorious House of Atreus, Field Marshal Agamemnon.”

Odysseus's address, as we now recognize, reflects and addresses Agamemnon's social position as both House of Atreus and as leader of the Greek *stratos*. However, at this point in the plot of the *Odyssey*, Agamemnon is no longer either of these. As I have suggested, from the perspective of mythological history, Agamemnon has been replaced as “Great House of Atreus” by his brother Menelaos. This replacement has been highlighted by the fact that, only in the *Odyssey*, is Menelaos addressed as Ἀτρεΐδῃ by members of the Greek *stratos*. Odysseus's use of this title in an address to Agamemnon here, at *Od.*11.397, does not present a problem for this analysis, but it does offer an opportunity to address an important issue to the sociolinguistic analysis I have presented, namely that sociolinguistic constraints on language use do not act like laws of physics, i.e., absolutely. I will briefly discuss three possible responses to the “problem” presented by this passage.

Odysseus's adventures in the realm of the fantastic, described by Odysseus himself in Books 9–11, reflect Odysseus' separation from the mythopolitical center of his world, Akhaian Greece, *Ithaka* and his own *oikos*. Odysseus's marginalization from, and subsequent reintegration into that world, is one of the primary themes of the poem. For Odysseus, cut off from the passage of mythical history, Agamemnon is still the Great House of Atreus, still Field Marshal. In essence, Odysseus still lives mythopolitically in the world of the *Iliad*.⁶⁸ Odysseus' failure to comply with the mores of address recognized outside in the “real world,” reiterates his isolation from that world. This isolation will be driven home by Agamemnon's warning at *Od.*11.442–3, as it has already by Teiresias' advice at *Od.*11.100–117. As Odysseus is out of touch with the “normal” Akhaian world at large, so he is unaware of the state of his own *oikos* and the trouble that awaits him there. Note, within the narrative of the poem, we, the audience, have already been introduced to Menelaos as Ἀτρεΐδῃ; thus, we are aware of facts to which Odysseus is not yet privy at the beginning of Book 11.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ In a sense, Heubeck acknowledges this when he claims that λ.397 is “taken from the *Iliad* (ii 434 etc.)” (Heubeck and Hoekstra 1989: 101).

⁶⁹ *Od.*4.156, 190, 235, 316, 492, 594.

Furthermore, by addressing Agamemnon as he does, Odysseus reflects the fact that, for him, “House of Atreus, Field Marshal Agamemnon” is who Agamemnon is. While Akhilleus actively contested Agamemnon’s position, Odysseus, in the *Iliad*, was always one of the proponents of the *status quo* and a supporter of Agamemnon’s authority, of which he was often the agent. For example in Book 2, it is Odysseus who rallies the troops by defending Agamemnon’s actions, and who later dresses down Thersites when *he* challenges Agamemnon’s leadership. Now, Odysseus, in the underworld, finds himself in a world of maximum unfamiliarity. It is a world as unlike *Ilion* or *Ithaka* as a place could be. Thus, by addressing Agamemnon as “Most glorious House of Atreus, Field Marshal Agamemnon,” Odysseus attempts to construct a more familiar world for himself in a time of maximum unfamiliarity. The address here, then, both responds to Odysseus’s surprise at finding Agamemnon dead, and helps construct a hedge against a world of confounded expectations.

Odysseus’s use of Ἀτρεΐδῃ here also suggests how sociolinguistic constraints are flexible. Use of such investing forms of address is not absolute and rigid. While Menelaos may be the nominal head of the house of Atreus now, Agamemnon is still, in some sense, worthy of the honor that such a title suggests. Ὁ Ἀτρεΐδης does not function like a job title (e.g., *Director of Graduate Studies*), such that when one’s tenure is over, the title is no longer applicable, and its use infelicitous. Rather, a better analogy might be the address *Mr. President*. While one is no longer president after one’s term in office, under certain circumstances, the former holder of that office is still addressable as *Mr. President*, sometimes, as at state functions, obligatorily so. In the case of the address *Mr. President*, certain pragmatic factors, such as having held the office of President, etc., pertain when the term is usable or when its use is mandated. This does not appear to be the case here with Agamemnon. Nevertheless, Odysseus’s use of the address Ἀτρεΐδῃ can be read as implying that Agamemnon is still, at least in the eyes of Odysseus, worthy of the honour that title implies, and that, therefore, his use of the title is not infelicitous. The constraints on the use of the title are not as rigid as they are in the cases of *President* or *Director of Graduate Studies*.

Lastly, the *Iliad* is mythohistorically related to the *Odyssey* in ways that function like background knowledge does in the real world. The one text relates a specific state of affairs, say Odysseus meeting Agamemnon in the underworld, or the President taking the oath of office, to other states of affairs, like the remembered past, an imagined future, a belief system, or a set of desires. Thus, Odysseus’s address can be read as both “remembering” the *Iliad* in some way and as referring a present state of affairs to an imag-

ined or “remembered” past. In this way, Odysseus’s address functions like Demodokos’s song, both relating one text to another in a relationship of imagined antecedence and also of constructing, within the narrative itself, a remembered past for Odysseus.

The patronymic, then, functions to indicate status not only within the Homeric *stratos*, but within the Homeric family and the society as a whole. Menelaos is never addressed as Ἀτρεΐδῃ within his own *Iliadic* Greek society but he is in the *Odyssey* after the death of his brother.⁷⁰ A parallel to what I have suggested for Menelaos can be found in the case of Telemakhos, who is never addressed by the patronymic Λαερτιάδῃ nor by the possible, but unattested *Ὀδυσσεΐδῃ or *υἱὲ Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο *vel sim.*⁷¹ While this fact may be an accident, it seems likely that it is because the fate of Odysseus is uncertain, and the suitors do not want to imply that there is a new and reigning head of household in *Ithaka*. Higbie has shown that a similar situation holds for the two sons of Τελαμών, Τεῦκρος and Αἴας, where only Αἴας can be addressed as Τελαμονιάδῃ. Note in this case however, that Τεῦκρος is an illegitimate child (Higbie 7).⁷² The restriction on address forms in the *Iliad* suggests that Agamemnon has a status within his own society fundamentally different from even that of his brother, Menelaos, or the other *basileis*. Social position, then, can have both an institutional aspect, that is, it can be understood to preexist any individual encounter in some way, and a specific, situational aspect. However, both aspects are (re)constructed by the interactants at the point of encounter, and so position is never absolutely fixed. Because social position is always constructed between individuals as they interact, their status is reflected directly in how those individuals may address each other.

⁷⁰ Bear in mind that, mythologically, the *Odyssey* “takes place” after Agamemnon’s narrative death, which is recounted starting at *Odyssey*, *Od.* 11.385.

⁷¹ The metrically identical phrase υἱὸς Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο is, however, well attested. Note that Λαερτιάδῃ and *Ὀδυσσεΐδῃ would be metrical doublets.

⁷² This argument assumes, either a single author for both poems—by no means a foregone conclusion—or at least a single “tradition.” The facts concerning Menelaos, Telemakhos, and Telamon are comparable to a similar phenomenon in the case of 19th century unmarried English women as represented, for example, in Jane Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice*. The oldest unmarried daughter would regularly be referred to (and would refer to herself) by the title *Miss* plus surname (e.g., Miss Bennett). Any younger sister would, by contrast, be referred to by the title *Miss*, followed by both her given- and sur-names (e.g., Miss Mary Bennett). When the oldest daughter married, the *honor* would fall on the next oldest unmarried daughter and she would come to be referred to as Miss Bennett. Thanks to Dan Collins (personal correspondence) for bringing this to my attention.

7. A CONCLUSION

The last bit of relevant evidence comes from Agamemnon himself who offers support for the importance of the patronymic as a sign of status. Near the beginning of Book 10, when the Greek camp is under imminent threat of falling to Hektor and the Trojans, the Greek leaders are in genuine fear for their ships, their only means of escape and return. The embassy to Akhilleus of the preceding book has failed to draw him back into the fight. Now Agamemnon orders that the men be awakened from sleep and called again to a council. Agamemnon's speech to Menelaos comes at a point of flagging morale. As a way of assuring that this goes well he says (*Il* 10.67–69):

φθέγγεο δ' ἥ κεν ἴησθα καὶ ἐγρήγορθαι ἄνωχθι,
πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς ὀνομάζων ἄνδρα ἕκαστον,
πάντας κυδαίνων· μηδὲ μεγαλίζεο θυμῷ[.]

Give a shout wherever you go and order them to wake up,
and each man, address him by the ancestry of his father and his name,
and so acknowledge to all their glory, and don't take a haughty tone with them.

Here Agamemnon directly equates πατρόθεν τινὰ ἐκ γενεῆς τὸ ὀνομάζειν with τὸ κυδαίνειν αὐτόν. Its opposite in turn is τὸ θυμῷ μεγαλίζεσθαι. The implications of this equation are that, for Agamemnon and presumably for the Homeric hero in general, one's πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς ὄνομα is part of what defines one's *kudos*.⁷³ To fail to acknowledge another's patronymic is to overstep one's place and be haughty (τὸ θυμῷ μεγαλίζεσθαι). Thus, the passage at *Il*.10.67–69 strongly suggests that the importance of proper address is overt and overtly acknowledged within the context of the Iliadic heroic world. As the importance of the term κλέος (literally “hearing”) suggests, within the world constructed by the poet, identity is socially constructed through σήματα not just in the language of the poet but in the “speech” of his characters (cf. Foley 1997). When Nestor addresses Agamemnon as Ἀγάμεμνον at *Il*.2.362, he temporarily divests him of his offices (as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, and as Ἀτρεΐδης) so he can close the social distance and offer advice necessary (or seemingly so) from a position from which it will best be received, i.e., from a position of authority, an authority based on Nestor's age-defined status. His use of the

⁷³ Telemakhos makes nearly the same equation in Book 1 of the *Odyssey* (*Od*.1.236–240), where he states that for Odysseus to have died at Troy or in the presence of his friends and thereby get a burial would be ὅ παιδὶ μέγα κλέος ἦρατ' ὀπίσσω (*Od*.1.240). The *kleos* of Odysseus would transfer to his son (ὅ παιδὶ). By extension, recollection of that father, say, through the use of the patronymic, would automatically invoke that *kleos*.

familiar address for Agamemnon at *Il.*2.363 gives him situational authority from which to proffer such advice.

I have suggested here how sociolinguistic tools can offer insight for a reading of Homer, despite the traditional and oral character of the text.⁷⁴ I have offered evidence that, in the *Iliad*, the two alternative forms of address that index the token identity of the addressee directly, the patronymic and the given name, were not simply metrical alternatives. I have argued that the choice between one or the other of these forms of address was not driven by the exigencies of oral composition in performance but served other, specifically pragmatic needs, and reflected the complex variety of Homer's narrativized social settings (cf. Lord 30–67).⁷⁵ The usefulness of these forms as aids to composition within the formulaic scheme described by Parry *et alii* has not been challenged here. I have been careful *not* to argue that these forms were not metrical variants, only that they were not *merely* metrical variants. Rather, the determining factors behind the poet's choice of one form over the other involved a set of selectional criteria that were not restricted to meter and (given) essential idea, but were more rich and complex.

In considering the above argument, the particular importance of the performative nature of Iliadic social position should be kept in mind.⁷⁶ Here, social position is not as fixed and institutional as in a formal caste system—although it presents elements reminiscent of institutional social structures, such as Agamemnon's and Khryses' staves, and Agamemnon's titles—but is constantly available for (re)negotiation within certain limits. In the case of Khryses, for example, his priest's staff serves as a symbol of his social role as priest of Apollo, which in turn equates to a certain social status. However, his status is successfully challenged by Agamemnon beginning at 1.26, and then again further redefined through the intervention of Apollo, Akhilleus, and Nestor during the progression of much of the rest of Book 1. One can also see how, within certain limits social position is constantly under renegotiation in the central struggle between Akhilleus and Agamemnon, which dominates

⁷⁴ I have purposely avoided taking a position as to whether the text of the *Iliad* is the product of oral composition in performance or merely composed so as to appear so. Without more evidence, this question cannot be answered definitively, and clearly lies outside of the scope of this paper.

⁷⁵ "[T]he formula is not only stripped to its essential idea in the mind of the composing singer, but also is denied some of the possibilities of aesthetic reference in context" (Lord 65–66).

⁷⁶ I purposefully contrast the term "Iliadic" with the often used "Homeric," to emphasize that, for the analysis of the speeches within the text of the *Iliad*, I make no reference to any imagined performative or compositional "real world" setting.

Book 1 but which is not fully resolved until Book 23. During the progress of this struggle, Akhilleus's position changes from one of singular importance within the society of the Greek *stratos* to one of effective marginalization.⁷⁷ Another example is the abortive duel between Glaukos and Diomedes in Book 6 and their subsequent acknowledgment of their mutual *xenia*. In this last case, even the seemingly fixed and institutional role of *enemy* can be available for renegotiation.⁷⁸

I have attempted here to show how a sociolinguistic and pragmatic methodology is applicable for the analysis of direct speech in Homeric poetry. This method works within a growing tendency among scholars and readers of Homer to see context as important in reading traditional characters in traditional poetry.⁷⁹ It contrasts in its results with that of the oral theory of Parry-Lord *et aliorum* and its evaluation of the force of the fixed epithet for Greek epic in one important way. According to the Parry-Lord model, the epic formulae (epitomized by the fixed epithet) serves to aid composition in performance—and perhaps to add a traditional tone to the resultant poetry—but at the cost of what Parry called *le mot juste*. The resultant constraint on the poet was felt to impart a certain semantic opacity to the forms used. This opacity is summed up in the term (given) “essential idea” wherein the term-set Ἀγόμενον, Ἀτρεΐδῃ, ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν reflected a single, simple, and unchanging core idea or identity, its essence. In this model, the strictures of meter and the demands of composition in performance had the result of simplifying referents by rendering all other semantic content of such concepts, including any potential social, political, or psychological implications, effectively invisible. Therefore, the term Ἀτρεΐδῃ could not be assumed to carry any other implication beyond that which compelled its choice in the first place, meter and the essential idea at its most basic. Much work has been done in the intervening years in response to the Parry-Lord theory, much of it critical of the implications of the stricter applications of this theory to the text of Homer (Edwards 1986, 1988 and Russo 1997).

⁷⁷ Akhilleus is never completely marginalized and his former/potential presence is constantly referred to, which in turn allows for his eventual reintegration; compare this with the case of a character like Thersites, whose marginalization by Odysseus in Book 2 is complete and thus he never reemerges into the narrative.

⁷⁸ Cf. also the case of Priam in Book 24, who is welcomed by Akhilleus and offered hospitality despite the grief and anger which each feels and their status as mutual *pol-emoi*. Through the agency of gods (Thetis and Hermes directly and Zeus indirectly) their status as mutual enemies is temporarily redefined as that of suppliant and supplicated, and then of *xenoi*.

⁷⁹ Among these, Beck, Higbie, Foley, Janko, Kahane and Nagy.

Ultimately, within a sociolinguistic framework of language employing a pragmatic understanding of how meaning is established, Parry's notion of essential idea is, in fact, extremely problematic. Problems arise not only because the term "essential idea" is undefined, but because it is not at all clear that characterization, at least on the social level, is able to be reduced to such an essence in the way that Parry and Lord's use of the term implies. Although much of Parry's restrictiveness has been challenged since, the place of the fixed epithet as the paragon of Parry's methodology, and the thoroughness with which he presented this portion of his model, have afforded it a relatively secure place, at least among non-specialists. I have shown how, unlike Lord's "drunken tavern," Agamemnon is not just Agamemnon; he is sometimes ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, sometimes Ἀτρεΐδῃ, and once merely Ἀγάμεμνον. He is in part defined by his social persona, which itself is unfixed, at least within a range. He occupies a complex and shifting social role, which is continuously under construction both by himself and by his interactants. One of the side effects of this paper should be to suggest not that the term, (given) "essential idea," needs to be (re)defined, but that it may simply not be very useful in the reading of Homer. In its stead, within the context of Homeric composition, some other model of identity needs to replace it, one that is based on a careful pragmatic reading of characters in contexts as social entities. Such a project is already well underway. Thus, by looking at some of these factors at play in Homer's terms of address, we can open wider the window into the complexity and richness of the poet's style. This study, by examining how sociolinguistic tools can help the reader illuminate the text of Homer, has attempted to serve as part of that critique.

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